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Abstract: 
 
The issue of state aid is crucial for the EU Member States that are implementing favorable 
tax regimes to foster investments and business activities performed by their tax resident 
companies. Up until recently, according to the General Court of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter – CJEU), where the European Commission (EC) has been 
assessing whether a specific tax measure qualifies as a state aid, it had been required to 
prove that such measure favors certain undertakings capable of identification because of 
characteristics specific to them that other undertakings do not possess. This approach has 
changed by the Judgment of the Court of Justice delivered on 21 December 2016 in joined 
cases C‑20/15 P and C‑21/15 P with which the EC burden of proof has been substantially 
eased in classifying measure at issue as selective.  
 
The aim of the research is, by researching the reasoning behind the conclusion reached by 
the Court of Justice and jurisprudence on fiscal state aid, to evaluate whether any fiscal 
measure introduced in the future that is not exempt under de minimis provision or other 
exemptions eventually may be classified as selective. 
 
Main research methods are legal theory research as well as applied law reform research. 
Theoretical research underlying the paper is focused on the analysis of the CJEU case-law 
related to the judgment, as well as the analysis of related publications and opinions, whereas 
the applied law research includes the analysis of social and economic impact of the CJEU 
and EC position on state aid in fiscal measures. The findings of the research determine to 
what extent the EC will have more leeway in investigations into state aid tax measures as it 
will not have to identify a specific category of beneficiaries. In its conclusion, the paper 
addresses the question of whether the EU Member States may practically in the future 
implement any fiscal favorable regime (and maintain existing ones) without a risk of the 
regime at issue being classified as selective.  
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1. Introduction 
  
On 21 December 2016, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (hereinafter – CJEU) has laid down a judgment in Joined Cases C-20/15 P 
Commission v World Duty Free Group (formerly Autogrill España SA) and C-21/15 
P Commission v Banco Santander SA and Santusa Holding SL concerning a Spanish 
corporate tax scheme on amortisation of financial goodwill resulting from 
shareholding in a foreign company of at least 5% and holding it without interruption 
for at least one year. Based on the appeals from the EC, the CJEU has set aside the 
judgments of the General Court of the European Union and has upheld the position 
of the EC, reverting the cases to the General Court. This judgment is a significant 
new cornerstone in the development of the jurisprudence interpreting the notion of 
selectivity in context of State Aid in the EU.  
 
The importance of the judgment lies in fact that this time the CJEU has broadened 
the meaning and scope of application of selectivity to cases when a measure benefits 
only companies that carry out certain transactions, even if the measure, in principle, 
is open to all companies. The judgment was welcomed by the EC, impacting future 
decisions in all State Aid cases, not only to fiscal aid situations, in a way that the EC 
is no longer required to perform such a thorough selectivity argumentation in State 
Aid decisions as was established by previous case-law exempting the general aid 
measures. 
 
In today’s world, when even after the EC decisions in cases like Fiat, Starbucks and 
McDonald’s, tax ruling practices in some countries are still widely used to attract 
foreign investors, the tax benefits in domestic systems of the Member States 
(especially with small domestic economies) remain crucial factors characterizing the 
investment landscape and fostering the investments. Thus, it is important for existing 
and future fiscal (and not only fiscal) aid measures that can be introduced by the 
Member States to be designed taking into account the new approach to the criterion 
of selectivity.  
 
Thus, the research question to be answered is to what extent the newly adopted 
interpretation of aid measure as selective may preclude introduction of new (fiscal) 
aid measures and maintenance of existing ones. The findings of the paper should 
lead to a discussion on whether the broadened interpretation of measure as selective 
does not jeopardize tax sovereignty of the Member States.  
 
The aim of the research is, by researching the reasoning behind the conclusion 
reached by the Court of Justice and jurisprudence on fiscal state aid, to evaluate 
whether any fiscal measure introduced in the future that is not exempt under de 
minimis provision or other exemptions eventually may be classified as selective. The 
tasks of the research: 
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1) To make an overview of the Spanish financial goodwill amortisation 
measure; 
2) To scrutiny the selectivity criteria in the EU State Aid, to provide a 
summary of the publications and case-law analysed; 
3) To determine why the Spanish financial goodwill amortisation measure has 
been qualified as a selective measure from the point of view of the CJEU 
despite of the previous decisions of the General Court; and 
4) To conclude whether the judgment of the CJEU provides more leeway for 
the European Commission in future State Aid cases and how the Member 
States should take it into the account.  
 
The subject of the study in broad sense is the Member States’ taxation measures and 
their conformity with the EU State Aid regulations, and in narrow sense – 
application of principle of selectivity of a tax measure on the example of the Spanish 
goodwill amortisation case. The paper attempts to answer the question of whether 
the CJEU judgment in the Spanish goodwill amortization case follows the previous 
case-law in the field of State Aid, as well what are the grounds for the broader 
understanding of the selective taxation measure. The limitations of the paper are: 
  
1) The paper will not include an in-depth analysis of the goodwill concept; 
2) The paper will not include comparable analysis of the financial goodwill 
amortization measure from economic or legal perspective;  
3) The paper also will not lay down an opinion on the application of the 
selectivity criteria in State Aid analysis.   
 
The CJEU judgment under analysis is very recent and is not yet widely addressed by 
the scholars, but its importance for the future development of the State Aid 
application practice of the EU Commission is very high since it allows the 
Commission to claim that a measure is applicable only to certain undertakings 
without having it proved in law or in fact. The problem faced in the research is 
certain inconsistency that already exists in the case-law of the CJEU on the 
selectivity criterion and definition of economic advantage. The paper should 
contribute to the discipline by describing the reasoning of the EU Commission, 
involved parties, the General Court and the CJEU applied in the case, provoking a 
theoretical discussion on whether such a broad interpretation of the selectivity of a 
given tax measure is appropriate in light of the existing case-law and actual facts of 
the given case.  
 
Having briefly described the Spanish goodwill amortisation measure, the paper 
provides overall description of the selectivity criterion as established in the case-law 
of the CJEU and then focuses on the dispute of whether the given Spanish legislation 
was or was not selective. Main research methods of the paper are legal theory 
research as well as applied law reform research. 
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2. Spanish rules on amortisation of financial goodwill 
 
It should be noted that an efficient state regulation and business activity support 
system is one of top priority factors to successful innovative development (Nechaev 
and Antipina, 2016) and the overall efficiency of government controls over 
innovative countries in Western Europe are generally higher than in other regions of 
the world (Zakharova et al., 2015). 
 
There are differences between the various categories of the EU Member States, 
including differences in design, functionality, stability and benefits of tax regimes. 
These differences reflect the different structures of tax revenues of the countries, and 
are the main reason why the Common Consolidated Tax Base solution has not been 
implemented in the European Union. With some similarities of the overall 
composition of the tax revenue, Low homogeneity exists for the volumes of 
corporate income between the EU Member States. Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg 
as international corporate centres have high level of volumes and from the other 
hand Germany has the lowest volume as % of GDP form all other countries (Liapis 
et al., 2012; Liapis and Thalassinos, 2013).  
 
While goodwill generally is characterized as an intangible, it is still not a universal 
notion. Its treatment differs across countries and is regulated differently for legal, 
accounting and tax purposes. The common definition for accounting purposes is 
given by IFRS 3: “[…] goodwill is measured as the difference between: 
  
1) the aggregate of (i) the value of the consideration transferred (generally at 
fair value), (ii) the amount of any non-controlling interest (NCI […]), and 
(iii) in a business combination achieved in stages […], the acquisition-date 
fair value of the acquirer's previously-held equity interest in the acquiree, 
and  
2) the net of the acquisition-date amounts of the identifiable assets acquired 
and the liabilities assumed (measured in accordance with IFRS 3).  
 
Such a difference, when calculated, is not necessarily positive, and it is recognisable 
as an intangible asset for financial and tax accounting purposes.  The role of 
goodwill in accounting of acquisitions rose in period from 2001 to 2005, when after 
a change of accounting approach, up to a half of acquisition price was accounted as 
goodwill and subsequently impaired (Gomes, 2012; Vovchenko et al., 2017).  
 
Whereas certain countries do not recognise goodwill as an intangible asset for tax 
amortisation purposes, in most cases there is an excess of the cost of acquiring the 
business over the value of the net assets acquired, and several governments in the 
European Union acknowledge the importance of allowing acquirers to amortize this 
excess as an intangible asset. For example, Hungary and the Netherlands nowadays 
allow the amortisation of goodwill for tax purposes limited to 10% of the purchase 
price per annum. Similar amortisation rights are also foreseen for the taxpayers in 
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Poland, Germany and Spain, and may be indirectly provided also by the law or 
practice of other Member States of the European Union (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2017).   
 
The impact of applying goodwill amortisation is the decrease of the tax burden for 
taxpayers, and it is a tax incentive from this perspective. Thus, right for goodwill 
amortisation is an important tool in providing legal tax benefits to the taxpayers. 
There’s no doubt that taxes are an important burden, because they reduce the return 
to, and / or increase the cost of entrepreneurial activity. Lower returns reduce the 
possibility for enterprises to undertake investment and create employment. On the 
contrary low taxes allow them to expand and create growth. Although this statement 
has a number of weaknesses and is not a single aspect impacting the investment 
climate in a given country, it cannot be denied that tax benefits play an important 
role in overall context (Glykou and Siokorelis, 2013).  
 
Article 12(5) of the Spanish Corporate Corporate Tax Act (Ley del Impuesto sobre 
Sociedades, hereinafter TRLIS) was introduced into the Spanish tax system by 
Article 2(5) of Act 24/2001 of 27 December 2001 amending the TRLIS. Royal 
Legislative Decree No 4/2004 of 5 March 2004 consolidated the amendments made 
until then to the Spanish Corporate Tax Act in a recast version. Article 12(5) of 
TRLIS entered into force on 1 January 2002. While the Spanish corporate tax policy 
in general at that time foreseen that the financial goodwill can only be amortised 
following a business combination that arises either as a result of acquisition or 
contribution of the assets held by independent companies or following a merger or 
de-merger operation, the newly introduced Article provided that a company which is 
taxable in Spain may deduct from its taxable income the financial goodwill deriving 
from the acquisition of a shareholding of at least 5% of a foreign company, in equal 
yearly instalments, for up to 20 years following the acquisition.  
 
The term “financial goodwill” means the goodwill that would have been booked if 
the shareholding company and the target company had merged. The concept of 
financial goodwill under Article 12(5) TRLIS introduced into the field of share 
acquisitions a notion that is usually used in transfer of assets or business 
combination transactions. According to Article 12(5) TRLIS, the financial goodwill 
is determined by deducting the market value of the tangible and intangible assets of 
the acquired company from the acquisition price paid for the shareholding. In 
addition, the amortisation of financial goodwill as introduced in 2001 was dependent 
on meeting number of requirements, as set by reference to Article 21 TRLIS: 
 
1) the direct or indirect holding in the foreign company must be at least 5% and 
must be held for an uninterrupted period of at least 1 year;  
2) the foreign company must be liable for a similar tax to that applicable in 
Spain; 
Favourable Tax Regimes that Constitute Selective State Aid from the Perspective of the Cjeu 
Recent Case-Law 
236 
 
3) the revenue of the foreign company must mainly derive from business 
activities carried out abroad. 
 
Upon initiation of formal investigation procedure by the Commission, the mentioned 
Article 12(5) of TRLIS was repealed by the end of 2008. The measure itself was 
unique in a sense that, among other measures aimed at stimulation of international 
expansion of domestic companies implemented by various EU Member States, the 
Spanish measure supported it in an indirect way through acquisition of shares of 
foreign entities.  
 
The main difference with other regimes that in one way or another allow amortising 
the goodwill for tax purposes, the Spanish rules have only been granting a benefit to 
the companies that invested in foreign subsidiaries. Also, in unique way, Article 
12(5) of TRLIS has allowed to account for goodwill for tax purposes in the cases 
with the share deals, instead of acquisition of goodwill as an intangible asset, which 
typically arises from mergers and acquisitions. In author’s opinion, such a measure 
for support of international expansion is a good example of exercise of tax 
sovereignty by an EU Member State.  
 
As known from the research materials, the biggest beneficiaries of the financial 
goodwill amortisation measure were: Banco Santander, World Duty Free Group 
(previously Autogrill) and Santusa Holding. These conglomerates represent two 
economic sectors, such as financial sector and travel retail trade (Santusa Holding is 
operating under the ownership of Banco Santander and provides, through its 
subsidiaries, financial services). There were also other 30 interested parties that have 
been participating in the goodwill amortisation scheme and that have, later on, 
submitted their comments on the Commission’s decisions. 
 
The below analysis of the State Aid aspects applicable to the Spanish goodwill 
amortisation measure is made understanding that the measure itself was adopted 
prior to the financial crisis of 2008 when specific aid measures were individually 
agreed with the Commission with benefit for banking sector. It needs to be 
mentioned also that the Commission investigation has started not due to notification 
from Spain, which is required as an EU Member State to consult state aid measures 
prior to their implementation, but based on the investigation request letters from 
certain Members of European Parliament.  
 
3. Concept of selective measure under the EU State Aid rules 
 
In order to clarify why the CJEU judgment in the Spanish financial goodwill 
amortisation case is of high importance one should first refer to the up-to-date 
jurisprudence in the State Aid area. Following Article 107(1) of the TFEU, “Save as 
otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
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shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
internal market”. It is obvious and follows from the settled practice that any types of 
tax measures may also well fall under the definition of the State Aid as they provide 
various kinds of benefits from the State resources – a tax rebate, tax refund, 
exemption etc. Thus, to qualify as State Aid, the following cumulative conditions 
have to be fulfilled: 
  
1) A measure must be granted out of State resources; 
2) It must confer an economic advantage to undertakings; 
3) The advantage must be selective;  
4) The measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and it must affect 
intra-EU trade. 
 
Whilst a tax amortisation is granted from the State resources since it decreases the 
tax revenue collected by the State and that a more beneficial taxation of 
undertakings is able to distort the competition between economic operators located 
in various Member States (tax competition phenomenon between the Member 
States), it is much less clear whether specific measure confers an economic 
advantage and it is even less clear which measures are selective and which are not.  
 
The selectivity criterion is usually the most difficult question in a State Aid 
assessment of tax measures. Selectivity is assessed in two steps: first, whether the 
tax measure is materially selective, and if yes – then, second, whether the measure 
can be justified by the nature and logic of the tax scheme. Material selectivity may 
be established in law or in fact, and it may result from criteria of application of a 
measure, such as legal form, size, industry or other conditions that can only be 
fulfilled by particular undertakings. If, on the other hand, all undertakings may 
benefit from a measure, then it is a general measure rather than selective one 
(Rydelski, 2010). 
 
As stated by the Commission already in 1998, “Tax measures which are open to all 
economic agents operating within a Member State are in principle general 
measures. They must be effectively open to all firms on an equal access basis, and 
they may not de facto be reduced in scope through, for example, the discretionary 
power of the State to grant them or through other factors that restrict their practical 
effect. However, this condition does not restrict the power of Member States to 
decide on the economic policy which they consider most appropriate and to spread 
the tax burden as they see fit across the different factors of production. If they apply 
without distinction to all firms and to the production of all goods, the following 
measures do not constitute State aid: 
— tax measures of a purely technical nature (for example, setting the rate of 
taxation, depreciation rules and rules on loss carry-overs; provisions to 
prevent double taxation or tax avoidance), 
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— measures pursuing general economic policy objectives through a reduction 
of the tax burden related to certain production costs (research and 
development (R&D), the environment, training, employment).” 
 
Following the Commission’s practice, it is of outmost importance that in order to 
determine whether the measure at issue is materially selective, it has to be 
established whether, within the context of the particular tax system, the measure 
constitutes an advantage for certain undertakings in comparison with others that are 
in similar legal and factual situation. As mentioned by the scholars, a tax measure in 
order to be classified as a general measure needs to cover a broad category of 
transactions in a non-discriminatory manner, and that any discrimination that cannot 
be justified by objective differences between the taxpayers would lead to a distortion 
of competition (Micheau, 2008). 
 
Since the assessment of selectivity for a tax measure involves drawing distinction 
between general system and specific measure, it is crucial to understand what is 
meant by “general tax system” and “tax exception”. Although the CJEU has from 
case to case been using various terminologies in application of the so-called 
“derogation test”, and there has been debate on whether this inconsistency should be 
considered as application of different approaches, it may be concluded that if there is 
a difference of treatment in favour of the recipients of the measure when compared 
to the other undertakings in a similar situation, then it can be concluded that the 
measure constitutes derogation that departs from the general system. 
 
Furthermore, since the very first CJEU judgment on the application of the 
derogation test, it has been stated that a selective aid measure may be justified on the 
basis of nature or general scheme of the system. In tax matters, there are two types 
of the justifications that may be invoked by the Member States: the one based on the 
principle of tax neutrality, which aims at banning any tax distortion of the tax 
system, and the other one which is aimed at combating tax avoidance. Although the 
wording of Article 107 does not provide for any kinds of justifications apart from 
derogations laid down in Articles 107(2) and (3), such an approach has been 
developed and maintained by both the Commission and the CJEU. It is alleged that 
such additional justification measures are required to mitigate potential adverse 
effects of the rigorous derogation test (Rydelski, 2010). 
 
There is certain criticism when it comes to the selectivity criteria when applied to the 
tax matters, since certain drawbacks and uncertainty may arise due to the complexity 
of the taxation field because there is confusion between the selectivity and 
advantage, difficulty in comparing two tax treatments and the necessity to find a 
balance for the derogation test. Since determination of existence of the advantage 
and the selectivity of the measure relies on the same approach, namely, a 
comparison that should be made between the tax treatment provided by the measure 
in question and tax treatment under general regime, both the CJEU and the 
Commission do not maintain that the difference in this aspect needs to be clear-cut. 
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Another complexity in application of the derogation test arises from attempts to 
identify which criteria needs to be used to determine to what extent two fiscal 
situations can be regarded as alike and comparable for State Aid purposes. In 
addition, there also exists a problem of defining the general tax system for assessing 
the selectivity of the tax measure. In dealing with these complexities, the 
Commission and the CJEU has applied a strict approach, whereby a tax measure is 
considered selective where it effectively favours certain undertakings over others, 
regardless of the number of undertakings concerned, the sectors involved or the 
activities carried on. In this complex context, justification of selective measures 
appears to be a last resort to exempt a measure from being confirmed to qualify as a 
State Aid, and, given the complexity of the State Aid case-law itself as well as of the 
taxation field, defining the market concerned to which the derogation test should be 
applied and where the justifications may be sought, often creates obstacles in clear 
understanding of how Article 107(1) of the TFEU needs to be applied (Rydelski, 
2010). 
 
4. Alleged State Aid and selectivity of the Spanish regime 
 
In its decision initiating the investigation, the Commission considered that the 
measure in question departed from the ordinary scope of the Spanish corporate tax 
system, which is the tax system of reference. The Commission also held that the tax 
amortisation of the financial goodwill resulting from the acquisition of a 5% 
shareholding in a foreign target company seemed to constitute an exceptional 
incentive. The Commission observed that the tax amortisation was available only to 
a specific category of undertakings, namely undertakings which acquire certain 
shareholdings, amounting to at least 5% of the share capital of a target company, and 
only in respect of foreign target companies. 
 
Referring to the basics of the State Aid policy in the business taxation, “The fact that 
some firms or some sectors benefit more than others from some of these tax 
measures does not necessarily mean that they are caught by the competition rules 
governing State aid. Thus, measures designed to reduce the taxation of labour for all 
firms have a relatively greater effect on labour-intensive industries than on capital-
intensive industries, without necessarily constituting State aid. Similarly, tax 
incentives for environmental, R&D or training investment favour only the firms 
which undertake such investment, but again do not necessarily constitute State aid.” 
 
It is interesting to mention in this relation that a year before the Commission has 
adopted its decision initiating an investigation into the Spanish financial goodwill 
amortisation case; it has also delivered another decision on Spanish regime which 
provided 50% reduction on the revenue from certain intangible assets. This decision 
is important and interesting not only because it is one of the handful of decisions 
where the Commission has decided that the measure in question does not constitute 
a State Aid (Rydelski, 2010) but also because the measure itself is comparable to the 
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one with amortisation of financial goodwill – in both cases the Commission has 
found a derogation from the ordinary corporate taxation rules, as well as it has 
determined an existence of an advantage. Thus, existence of a selective advantage 
was crucial in deciding whether the measures constitute State Aid.  
 
Nevertheless, Commission’s conclusions in both cases differ. In its decision on the 
Spanish scheme for intangible assets the Commission states: “[…] the fact that not 
every undertaking decides to self-develop a qualifying intangible asset and then 
receives remuneration for the transfer of the right to use or exploit such asset merely 
reflects an economic reality. More importantly, the measure does not strengthen the 
position of any particular class of undertakings in relation to others competing in 
intra-Community trade and applies without distinction to all economically active 
persons. In line with Commission Communications on direct business taxation and 
the effective use of tax incentives in favour of R&D tax measures which are open to 
all economic agents operating within a Member State are in principle general 
measures.” 
 
In contrast, in the Spanish financial goodwill amortization case, despite the 
arguments provided by the Kingdom of Spain and 30 interested parties, the 
Commission  has concluded that “[although Article 12(5) TRLIS is drafted to apply 
to all operators established in Spain, in practice only a limited and identifiable 
number of companies with a Spanish tax base, which make foreign acquisitions in 
the relevant tax year and have a sizeable tax base against which to offset the 
financial goodwill deduction, can benefit from the application of the measure on an 
annual basis. As a result, the measure at issue in fact gives a different tax treatment 
even to Spanish operators in the same position of making acquisitions abroad.” In 
its reasoning, the Commission has referred to the CJEU judgment in case of export 
aid for steel undertakings, stating that “a tax reduction favouring only exports of 
national products constitutes State aid” and “[d]espite the arguments put forward 
by the Spanish authorities that the measure at issue in the latter case is not selective 
because Article 37 TRLIS applies to all Spanish undertakings that invest 
internationally, the Court concluded that the measure constituted State aid since it 
was limited to one category of undertakings, namely undertakings making certain 
international investments”. 
 
Without going into the details of the proceedings in the General Court that were 
initiated by an application lodged by World Duty Free Group SA, Banco Santander 
SA and Santusa Holding SL, the General Court has dismissed the Commission’s 
decisions on the grounds that the Commission has erred in application of Article 
107(1) of the TFEU. The judgment of the General Court, being grounded by the 
numerous judgments of the CJEU, has stated that “the category of export 
undertakings — even though it is, in the same way as, for example, the category of 
undertakings manufacturing goods […] extremely broad — must be regarded as 
comprising undertakings which can be distinguished on account of common 
characteristics linked to their export activity”, as well as that “[t]he case-law cited 
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in paragraph 82 above, regarding undertakings with export activities, thus does not 
make it possible to conclude that the EU courts classified a tax measure as selective 
without the identification of a particular category of undertakings or the production 
of certain goods which could be distinguished on account of their specific 
characteristics.” 
 
The final word in the dispute of whether the financial goodwill amortisation case 
was or was not selective measure that constitutes the State Aid was put by the CJEU 
in its judgment dated 21 December 2016. The CJEU has stated that the General 
Court has clearly misapplied the selectivity condition laid down in Article 107(1) 
TFEU. Without discussing the wording and peculiar reasoning of the CJEU, the 
message is that the economic operators who were not acquiring the shares of the 
foreign subsidiaries were discriminated against those that were acquiring such 
shares, disregarding the fact that the tax measure at issue may not be elective. The 
CJEU went so far to provide an additional interpretation to the judgment of 8 
November 2001, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke, 
stating that “[…] it cannot be inferred from paragraph 36 of the judgment of 8 
November 2001, Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke 
(C‑143/99, EU:C:2001:598), according to which measures are not selective where 
they apply to all the undertakings in the national territory, ‘regardless of their 
activity’, that a measure whose application does not depend on the nature of the 
undertakings’ activity is, a priori, not selective.” 
 
In author’s view, the most important finding of the CJEU is made in paragraph 86 of 
the judgment on financial goodwill amortisation: “It follows that a condition for the 
application or the receipt of tax aid may be grounds for a finding that that aid is 
selective, if that condition leads to a distinction being made between undertakings 
despite the fact that they are, in the light of the objective pursued by the tax system 
concerned, in a comparable factual and legal situation, and if, therefore, it 
represents discrimination against undertakings which are excluded from it.” Such a 
finding allows, basically, to say that the companies that are not investing in foreign 
subsidiaries, gain an advantage against the companies that invest in the domestic 
subsidiaries, although there are in the same legal and factual situation. This finding 
substantiates all of the further CJEU’s findings, leading to the following conclusion: 
“the tax advantage conferred by the measure at issue can be obtained without any 
minimum investment requirement and without, consequently, the benefit of that 
measure being reserved to undertakings having sufficient financial resources, those 
factors do not preclude the possibility of that measure being classified as selective 
for other reasons, such as the fact that resident undertakings making acquisitions of 
shareholdings in companies resident for tax purposes in Spain could not obtain that 
advantage”. 
  
5. Conclusions 
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The existing case-law of the CJEU and the Commission’s practice in application of 
the derogation test in State Aid review of the fiscal measures left some space for a 
debate on whether there is single common approach to determine whether an 
economic advantage is conferred by a given measure and whether such an advantage 
is selective in facts. The case-law and the Commission’s decisions are the main 
sources that the Spanish government and authorities (in the specific case), since the 
TFEU provides only general provision on State Aid prohibition.  
 
Being guided by Article 107(1) of the TFEU which prohibits favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods, as well as relying on the developed 
case-law of the CJEU and the Commission practice to that date, it may be concluded 
in good faith that the measure, such as Spanish financial goodwill measure 
introduced in Article 12(5) of the TRLIS, was not designed in a discriminatory way 
nor it should have had as an effect a practical discrimination of certain undertakings 
over the others. The research did not show that there would be guidance available 
from the case-law or the Commission’s practice to lead to a conclusion that the 
measure at question would be providing a selective advantage to certain category of 
undertakings, and thus should be considered a general measure which is not 
prohibited by the TFEU. 
 
The Commission has alleged, and the CJEU has recently confirmed, that only certain 
large identifiable undertakings could potentially benefit from that measure. The 
Spanish authorities and the involved parties were not able to demonstrate and to 
prove that the measure had as its beneficiaries a broad unlimited scope of 
undertakings. Based on this, the Commission has maintained that there is no need to 
determine which particular category of undertakings is benefiting from the measure 
more that the others. The CJEU has approved such an approach, broadening the 
definition of selective advantage established by the previous case-law to the 
situations, where the undertakings that take decisions to invest in shares of foreign 
companies are in more advantageous position to those deciding to invest in domestic 
companies, even though Article 12(5) of TRLIS did not impose any limitations on 
the scope of application of the goodwill amortisation measure.  
 
The judgment of the CJEU has an important impact on all future State Aid reviews 
performed by the Commission (not only with respect to the fiscal measures) since it 
will have more leeway in application of the derogation test and, strictly speaking, 
will not be required to identify specifically which category of the undertakings is 
treated more favourably.  
 
The analysed judgment of the CJEU in Spanish financial goodwill amortisation case, 
in theory, will allow the Commission to conclude that any measure, stimulating 
certain economic operations, is a selective advantage. If certain measure in the future 
would (as a theoretical example) support investments in both domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries, the Commission may still argue that such a measure favours the 
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undertakings that are in principle able to acquire shares in subsidiaries, as compared 
to those that decide to invest in manufacturing assets.  
 
In overall, given that the analysed judgment of the CJEU may bring additional 
uncertainty into application and self-assessment of the fiscal measure which a 
Member State may wish to introduce, it is proposed that the Member States request 
the Commission to issue and additional revised notice on the application of the State 
Aid to the fiscal measures to provide clarity to the authorities of the Member States. 
In its notice, the Commission would need to provide guidance on the question of to 
what extent the definition of “category of undertakings” need to be broadened in 
application to the fiscal aid measures.  
 
It is also proposed that prior to issuing such a notice the Commission opens a public 
consultation with the interested Member States as well as with the economic 
operators. One should also follow the proceedings in the General Court which will 
take place after the case being reverted by the CJEU, which may bring additional 
information for another analysis of the topic.  
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